This was the first week of the term and we formed our groups this week. We used this week to set up the blog for our project and select ten structure failures. We narrowed down the ten failures to three structure failures to deeply research. The ten structural failures we picked were due to the fact that they seemed interesting. The ten structural failures are as follows: Tacoma Narrows Bridge, St. Anthony Falls Bridge, Hyatt Regency Walkway, Seongsu Bridge, Sampoong Department Store, Silver Bridge, Lotus Riverside Compound, Rainbow Bridge, Royal Plaza Hotel, and the Quebec Bridge. These structural failures were whittled down to three by a set of goals. The group wanted to focus on bridges, so that eliminated structures that aren't bridges. We decided to focus on bridges because we all took the K'NEX bridge lab last term and we wanted to further our understanding of the failure of bridges. We also wanted to focus on bridges that failed due to human error rather than natural disasters. Human error can be analyzed because we can look at the decisions the engineer made and evaluate them.
Additionally the design proposal was also completed during this first week. We put the document on Google Docs and contributed equally to finish it. The three failures that were chosen were: Tacoma Narrows Bridge, Silver Bridge, and Quebec Bridge. As reasoned above, these structures were chosen because they are bridges and failed due to human error. Before class this morning we submitted our design proposal and updated our blog biographies.
Week 2
The first task that we focused on this week was correcting the blog as well as updating a few items on our design proposal. We went through and added more information to our biographies, as well as filling in our background page to give our readers more insight as to why we choose to research structural failure. We created a timetable to organize our work and set up deadlines. The timetable is as follows.
- What materials and systems were used in the construction of the structure?
- What were the causes of structural failure?
- What were the consequences of the failure?
- What technical lessons were learned from the failure?
- What ethical lessons were learned?
- What were the legal ramifications of the failure?
- What are your personal take-away from the failure?
Week 3
This week we looked over our design proposal with our fellow and instructor. We determined we had a focused subject and that the three structures we chose will suffice. As a group we dove into research, using Google Scholar to find legitimate sources. Google Scholar is very helpful to the group because these documents have been peer reviewed and deeply researched before they were published. We do have regular online sources, but they are not from random websites; our online sources come from online encyclopedias. This week we determined who will do what and the timeline of the project. Emmanuel was deemed group leader, along with his jobs of blog management and editing the researchers’ work. The other three members of the group were given specific structures to research along with clear-cut questions to answer. Bill was assigned the Quebec Bridge, Mike was assigned the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, and Nick was assigned the Silver Bridge. The two questions each member will answer this week is as follows:
What materials and systems were used in the construction of the structure?
What were the causes of the structural failure?
These questions are quite broad and allow the three members doing research to find a solid amount of information. Each research member is responsible for a single bridge, as listed above. An excerpt of the Quebec Bridge report is listed below in blue, so the reader can understand the type of format we are using:
The specifications called for a cantilever structure. The material for the structure was to be steel. The basic configuration of a cantilever bridge is shown in Figure 1. However, suspension bridge designs were allowed, providing they came with their own set of specifications. Earlier, noted French engineer Gustave Eiffel had considered the problem and found that a cantilever design would be superior to either a suspension or an arch bridge for the Quebec site.
The concept of the cantilever structure was first used in 1867. William Middleton gives a clear definition of a cantilever bridge in his book: “cantilever bridge: a bridge form based upon the cantilever principal. In its typical form cantilever arms projecting toward the center of the span from main piers are continuous with and counterbalanced by anchor arms extending between the main piers and anchor pier at each end. A simple span suspended between the two cantilever arms completes the structure. The weight of the suspended span and the cantilever arms is counterbalanced by that of the anchor arms and an anchorage embedded in the anchor pier” (175).
The Quebec Bridge was the longest cantilever structure ever to be attempted during its day. It would bridge the St. Lawrence River approximately 14 km north of Quebec connecting into the Grand Trunk rail line. The cantilever arms would reach a distance of 171.5 m. They were to support a suspended span with a length of 205.7 m. It would stand 45.7 m above the river. The initial design clear span length was 487.7 m.
As seen from the above excerpt, the structure is described in depth and a figure is provided. This format will be followed for the rest of our report as we dive deeper into our research.
Week 4
This week was much of the same as last week. We met with our fellow and instructor to ensure the vision of the report was in line with their desires. Each of the three researchers delved deeper into their research to continue their individual parts. The two questions that were answered this week for each of the three bridge failures are as follows:
Figure 3: Wreckage of the bridge.
Figure 4. Typical
shaking pattern of bridge with twisting pattern leading to collapse beneath
Week 5
Week 8
This week the group focused on making corrections to their final draft as well as corrections to the powerpoint. Although we were supposed to present, there was not enough time to do so. Thus after attending lecture, where Mr. Terranova discussed "Do's" and "Don't's" for the presentation, the group decided that it would be in their best interest to correct their slides. Finally the group worked on perfecting their final draft. This is the first paragraph of the final report, the abstract;
What materials and systems were used in the construction of the structure?
What were the causes of the structural failure?
These questions are quite broad and allow the three members doing research to find a solid amount of information. Each research member is responsible for a single bridge, as listed above. An excerpt of the Quebec Bridge report is listed below in blue, so the reader can understand the type of format we are using:
The specifications called for a cantilever structure. The material for the structure was to be steel. The basic configuration of a cantilever bridge is shown in Figure 1. However, suspension bridge designs were allowed, providing they came with their own set of specifications. Earlier, noted French engineer Gustave Eiffel had considered the problem and found that a cantilever design would be superior to either a suspension or an arch bridge for the Quebec site.
The concept of the cantilever structure was first used in 1867. William Middleton gives a clear definition of a cantilever bridge in his book: “cantilever bridge: a bridge form based upon the cantilever principal. In its typical form cantilever arms projecting toward the center of the span from main piers are continuous with and counterbalanced by anchor arms extending between the main piers and anchor pier at each end. A simple span suspended between the two cantilever arms completes the structure. The weight of the suspended span and the cantilever arms is counterbalanced by that of the anchor arms and an anchorage embedded in the anchor pier” (175).
Figure 1: Structural behavior of cantilever bridge.
The Quebec Bridge was the longest cantilever structure ever to be attempted during its day. It would bridge the St. Lawrence River approximately 14 km north of Quebec connecting into the Grand Trunk rail line. The cantilever arms would reach a distance of 171.5 m. They were to support a suspended span with a length of 205.7 m. It would stand 45.7 m above the river. The initial design clear span length was 487.7 m.
As seen from the above excerpt, the structure is described in depth and a figure is provided. This format will be followed for the rest of our report as we dive deeper into our research.
What materials and systems were used in the construction of
the structure?
The Tacoma Narrows Bridge was constructed of reinforced
steel structural steel, wire cables, concrete, treated timber and untreated
timber. The suspension bridge was the longest standing at the time, nearly
6,000 feet long and 26 feet wide. (Washington)
Figure 1. Sketch of
Tacoma Narrows Bridge
What were the causes of the structural failure?
The ratio for length to width was incorrect, but this could
not have been determined at the time of its construction as no suspension
bridge of this size had been made yet, so the engineers were going off of
ratios and information that would be obsolete in this construction. What ended
up happening was that the road itself was too light, as it was too narrow.
Also, the way the roadway was designed worked as an air foil does on a plane,
creating lift. These two problems combined is what made the bridge receive its
nickname, “Galloping Gertie”. Although the bridge was designed to be able to
withstand 140 mph winds, one day when the wind was 40 mph, the lift created
proved to be too much for the structure, causing it to twist. The twisting
motion soon overcame the tensile strength of the concrete and began to crack
and fall into the water below in sections, with the whole roadway eventually
collapsing. (Washington)
This week was much of the same as last week. We met with our fellow and instructor to ensure the vision of the report was in line with their desires. Each of the three researchers delved deeper into their research to continue their individual parts. The two questions that were answered this week for each of the three bridge failures are as follows:
What were the consequences of the
failure?
What technical lessons were learned
from the failure?
An excerpt from one of the reports is listed below in blue to give the reader an idea of what the consequences section will look like:
Meanwhile, back at the construction site, at
about the same time the decision makers in Phoenixville were ending their
meeting, the Quebec Bridge collapsed at 5:30 p.m. The thunderous roar of the
collapse was heard 10 km away in Quebec.
The entire south half of the bridge, approximately 189 MN of steel, fell
into the waters of the St. Lawrence within 15 s.econds Eighty-six workers were
present on the bridge at the time. Only 11 workers on the span survived.
The A9L bottom compression
chord, which was already bent, gave way under the increasing weight of the
bridge. The load transferred to the opposite A9R chord that also buckled. The
piers were the only part of the structure that survived. The wreckage is shown
in Fig. 3, looking from the south bank toward the pier. Of 38 Caughnawaga
Mohawk ironworkers who had left their village to work on the bridge, 33 were
killed and two were injured.
The above excerpt shows what the consequences section will look like.
What were the consequences of the failure?
Three cars and a dog trapped in a car fell into the river
along with the roadway. The dog was the only death. The bridge collapsed and a
new bridge was built to replace it. (Washington)
What technical lessons were learned from the failure?
The failure of this bridge made engineers reconstruct their
idea of the proper length-width ratio, as this bridge was too narrow and weak.
It also made engineers take air flow into effect, placing holes in the side of
the roadways so that the air can flow freely through it, instead of possibly causing
lift like it did with the Tacoma Narrows bridge. (Washington)
Week 5
This week the group members finished the rough draft of their individuals reports. All applicable questions that we included on the FAQ / Questions to Consider page were answered. The three rough drafts will not be included in this blog due to the fact that it is about a 22 page document, but one of the bridges will be. There are links available at the bottom of this rough draft that leads to the reports for each individual bridge. The entire section for the Quebec Bridge, along with the section headings that are the main questions, is below:
QUEBEC BRIDGE
What materials and systems were used in the construction of this
structure?
The specifications of the Quebec Bridge called for a
cantilever structure. The material for
the structure was to be steel. The basic configuration of a cantilever bridge
is shown in Figure 1. Suspension and arch bridges were other options
considered, provided they came with their own set of specifications. French
engineer Gustave Eiffel had considered the bridge type and found that a
cantilever design would be superior to either a suspension or an arch bridge
for the Quebec site.
The
cantilever structure was used first in 1867 (Pearson and Delatte 2006, p. 86).
William Middleton gives a clear definition of a cantilever bridge in his book:
“cantilever bridge: a bridge form based upon the cantilever principal. In its
typical form cantilever arms projecting toward the center of the span from main
piers are continuous with and counterbalanced by anchor arms extending between
the main piers and anchor pier at each end. A simple span suspended between the
two cantilever arms completes the structure. The weight of the suspended span
and the cantilever arms is counterbalanced by that of the anchor arms and an
anchorage embedded in the anchor pier” (175).
Figure 1: Structural behavior of a cantilever
bridge.
The Quebec Bridge was the longest cantilever structure
ever to be attempted during its day (Pearson and Delatte 2006, p. 85). It would bridge the St. Lawrence River
approximately 14 km north of Quebec connecting into the Grand Trunk rail line.
The cantilever arms would reach a total distance of 171.5 m. These arms were to support a suspension span of
length 205.7 m. The bridge would stand
45.7 m above the river. Initially, the design clear span length was 487.7 m
(Pearson and Delatte 2006, p. 86).
In May 1900, the clear span length was increased to 548.6
m by Theodore Cooper. Cooper was a famous bridge builder and consultant out of
New York City, and he was chosen to be the consulting engineer for the Quebec
Bridge. Cooper had very strong
qualifications which is why he was chosen to be on the project. In his long career, he had written
an award-winning paper pioneering the use of steel for railway bridges, and had
prepared general specifications for iron and steel bridges (Petroski 1995). His
method of accounting for railroad loads on bridge structures became widely used
(Middleton 2001, p. 37). When Cooper increased the clear span
length, he stated that this would do three important things; it would eliminate
the uncertainty of constructing piers in such deep water, lessen the effects of
ice, and shorten the time of construction of the piers (Pearson and Delatte
2006, p. 87). Although there were sound engineering reasons
for this change, it was also true that the lengthening of the span would also
make the Quebec Bridge the longest cantilever bridge in the world (Petroski
1995, p. 46; Middleton 2001).
Construction of the bridge officially began on October 2,
1900, after a grand ceremony. The Quebec Bridge Company had enough funds to
begin erecting the substructure. The completed piers would stand approximately
8 m above the highest water level. The piers were made of huge granite facing
stones with concrete backing (Pearson and Delatte 2006, p. 87). The top 5.8 m of
each pier was made of solid granite. The piers were tapered 1 in 12 until they
reached the dimensions of 9.1 m by 40.5 m at the top. Each pier rested on a
concrete filled caisson that was 14.9 m wide, 7.6 m high, and 45.7 m long,
weighing 16.2 MN (1,600 t) (Middleton 2001, pp. 48–50).
What were the causes of the structural
failure?
The causes of the failure are best summarized by the
Royal Commission Report. This report
states that immediate cause of failure was found to be the buckling of
compression chords A9L and A9R. The official report attributed the collapse to
a number of reasons (Pearson and Delatte 2006, p. 89). Below, major reasons of the failure are
listed below. A man named Peter Szlapka
is mentioned in the reasons. He is the
chief design engineer for the Phoenix Company; this company was the firm in
charge of the construction of the bridge.
The seven major reasons will be listed below (Holgate et al. 1908, pp.
9-10).
1. “The collapse of the Quebec Bridge resulted from the failure of the lower chords in the anchor arm near the main pier. The failure of these chords was due to their defective design.”
2.“We do not consider that the specifications for the work were satisfactory or sufficient, the unit stresses in particular being higher than any established by past practice. The specifications were accepted without protest by all interested.”
3.“A grave error was made in assuming the dead load for the calculations at too low a value and not afterwards revising this assumption. This error was of sufficient magnitude to have required the condemnation of the bridge, even if the details of the lower chords had been of sufficient strength, because, if the bridge had been completed as designed, the actual stresses would have been considerably greater than those permitted by the specifications. This erroneous assumption was made by Mr. Szlapka and accepted by Mr. Cooper, and tended to hasten the disaster.”
4. “The loss of life on August 29, 1907, might have been prevented by the exercise of better judgment on the part of those in responsible charge of the work for the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company and for the Phoenix Bridge Company.”
5. “The failure on the part of the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company to appoint an experienced bridge engineer to the position of chief engineer was a mistake. This resulted in a loose and inefficient supervision of all parts of the work on the part of the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company.”
6. “The work done by the Phoenix Bridge Company in making the detail drawings and in planning and carrying out the erection, and by the Phoenix Iron Company in fabricating the material was good, and the steel used was of good quality. The serious defects were fundamental errors in design.
7. “The professional knowledge of the present day concerning the action of steel columns under load is not sufficient to enable engineers to economically design such structures as the Quebec Bridge. A bridge of the adopted span that will unquestionably be safe can be built, but in the present state of professional knowledge a considerably larger amount of metal would have to be used than might be required if our knowledge were more exact.”
1. “The collapse of the Quebec Bridge resulted from the failure of the lower chords in the anchor arm near the main pier. The failure of these chords was due to their defective design.”
2.“We do not consider that the specifications for the work were satisfactory or sufficient, the unit stresses in particular being higher than any established by past practice. The specifications were accepted without protest by all interested.”
3.“A grave error was made in assuming the dead load for the calculations at too low a value and not afterwards revising this assumption. This error was of sufficient magnitude to have required the condemnation of the bridge, even if the details of the lower chords had been of sufficient strength, because, if the bridge had been completed as designed, the actual stresses would have been considerably greater than those permitted by the specifications. This erroneous assumption was made by Mr. Szlapka and accepted by Mr. Cooper, and tended to hasten the disaster.”
4. “The loss of life on August 29, 1907, might have been prevented by the exercise of better judgment on the part of those in responsible charge of the work for the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company and for the Phoenix Bridge Company.”
5. “The failure on the part of the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company to appoint an experienced bridge engineer to the position of chief engineer was a mistake. This resulted in a loose and inefficient supervision of all parts of the work on the part of the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company.”
6. “The work done by the Phoenix Bridge Company in making the detail drawings and in planning and carrying out the erection, and by the Phoenix Iron Company in fabricating the material was good, and the steel used was of good quality. The serious defects were fundamental errors in design.
7. “The professional knowledge of the present day concerning the action of steel columns under load is not sufficient to enable engineers to economically design such structures as the Quebec Bridge. A bridge of the adopted span that will unquestionably be safe can be built, but in the present state of professional knowledge a considerably larger amount of metal would have to be used than might be required if our knowledge were more exact.”
What were the consequences of the failure?
It is worth noting and emphasizing the structure collapse
did not come as a surprise to some of the engineers on the project. One young engineer, Norman McLure, was noting
deflections in the chords as early as two months before the collapse. McLure told Cooper, and the men came to the
conclusion that these deflections occurred due to an unknown preexisting
condition (Pearson and Delatte 2006, pp. 86-87). The men were not alarmed with the
deflections, and considered them to be relatively insignificant. Deflections continued to increase as the
project went on, and Cooper was notified of them. Two weeks before the collapse, Cooper wired a
message to McLure asking how bend had occurred in more chords (Middleton 2001, pp.
72-73).
The members under the highest compression loads continued
to buckle, and tensions grew on the worksite.
Cooper was not on the worksite, but the workers there could see the
deflections and became very concerned.
McLure did not have the confidence to contradict Cooper because he was a
young engineer and Cooper was renowned in the field. Another inspection took place two days before
the collapse, and it was found that the deflections in the A9L and A9R chords
had increased by three times as much in the last two weeks (Pearson and Delatte
2006, p. 89). McLure halted work on the
site and notified Cooper that work was halted.
McLure then went straight to New York to seek advice from Cooper
(Middleton 2001, pp. 78-79).
The erection foreman resumed worked the next day (the day
before the collapse) without McLure’s permission, because he was confident the
deflections were not a large concern.
The next day, news of the resumed work reached the Phoenix Company
office, and the supervisors met to discuss the plan of action. The supervisors at the office determined work
resuming was a good decision (Pearson and Delatte 2006, p. 89). That same day, McLure and Cooper wired the
office, saying, “Add no more load to the bridge until after due consideration
of facts. McLure will be over at five
o’clock.” Once McLure got the office, he
and the supervisors met, and decided to resume their meeting the next morning
(Pearson and Delatte 2006, p. 89).
Back at the construction site, at roughly the same time
the supervisors in Phoenixville were ending their meeting, the Quebec Bridge
collapsed at 5:30 p.m. The thunderous roar of the collapse was heard 10 km away
in Quebec (Pearson and Delatte 2006, p. 90).
The entire south half of the bridge, approximately 189 MN of steel, fell
into the waters of the St. Lawrence River within 15 seconds. Eighty-six workers were present on the bridge
at the time; only 11 workers on the span survived.
The A9L bottom compression chord, the one already bent, gave way under
the increasing weight of the bridge. The load transferred to the opposite A9R
chord that also buckled (Pearson and Delatte 2006, pp. 91-92). The piers were
the only part of the structure that survived. The wreckage is shown below in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Wreckage of the bridge.
What technical lessons were learned from the failure?
The fall of this massive bridge can be traced back to several technical
factors. The top and bottom chords for the anchor and cantilever arms of a
bridge were typically designed as straight members. This common practice made
the fabrication of these members easier. The bottom chords for the anchor and
cantilever arms in the Quebec Bridge were slightly curved, as shown in Figure 3,
for aesthetic reasons. This added difficulty to the fabrication of such
unusually large members. The curvature also in- creased the secondary stresses
on the members, reducing their buckling capacity. According to a letter written
to Engineering Record, “As a rule secondary stresses are much more
dangerous in compression than in tension members, which seem to have been the
first to give way in the Quebec bridge”
Another concern during the erection of the bridge was the joints. The
ends of all the chords were shaped to allow for the small deflections that were
expected to occur when the chords came under their full dead load. These butt
splices were bolted to allow for movement. The splices initially touched only
at one end, and would not fully transfer their load until they had deflected
enough for full bearing at the splices. At this point, they were to be
permanently riveted in place. The result was to be a rigid joint that
transferred loads uniformly across its area to ensure only axial loading. Great
care had to be taken while working around these joints until they were riveted.
Adding to the design problems, Cooper increased the original allowable
stresses for the bridge. He allowed 145 MPa for normal loading and 165 MPa
under extreme loading conditions. These were questioned by the bridge engineer
for the railways and canals as being unusually high. The new units’ stresses
were accepted based solely on Cooper’s reputation.
Figure 3: Quebec Bridge just before collapse.
What ethical lessons were learned from the failure?
Several ethical concerns can be pointed out in this case. The major one
is that deformations went unheeded for so long. The engineers on site argued
among themselves as to the cause. Al- though the workers who failed to report
to work because of the deformations lacked the technical expertise, they seemed
to be the only ones who understood what was really happening to the bridge
(Middleton 2001, p. 78). Engineers and
others in charge must be open minded to the ideas of the laborers, many of
which have years of experience.
Another ethical concern was Cooper’s rejection of an independent
engineer to check his work. His decisions were not questioned, even when they
seemed to be unusual. An independent consultant may not have allowed the higher
than normal design stresses. Some of the other errors such as the
underestimated dead loads and the failure to recheck the weight could have been
dis- covered before the bridge collapsed. In the end, “Cooper’s engineering
expertise became the sole factor that was relied upon for assuring structural
integrity of the bridge” (Roddis 1993).
What were the legal ramifications of the failure?
There were no legal
ramifications for any of the engineers or foreman. Cooper and Szlapka, arguably the ones most at
fault, walked free.
References
Holgate, H., Derry, J., G.
G., and Galbraith, J. (1908) Royal Commission Quebec Bridge Inquiry Rep. l Sessional Paper No 154, S.E. Dawson,
printer to the King, Ottawa.
Middleton, W. D. (2001) Bridge
at Quebec, Indiana University Press, Ind.
Pearson, C., and Delatte, N.
(2006). “Collapse of the Quebec Bridge, 1907.” J.Perform.Constr.Facil., l 20(1), 84-91.
Petroski, H. (1995). Engineers of dreams: Great bridge
builders and the spanning of America, Knopf, l New
York.
Roddis, W. M. K. (1993) “Structural
failures and engineering ethics.” J. Struct. Eng., 119(5), 1539–1555.
Week 6
This week the group worked on putting together all the different rough drafts and formatting it into one fluid document. This document serves as our draft for our final report. This draft is essentially the research that each group member has found concerning the causes for failure for each of their individual bridges. This is the final deliverable for our entire project, and provides answers to the questions on structural failures. Here is the introduction that will be in the final report;
This project is designed to look at structural failures and why they happened. This project will be a twenty-page report that looks at three different failures. The failures will be looked at in depth to ensure every piece of evidence was looked at. The objectives for learning will be to gain a better understanding of why these structures actually failed. If the engineers who were constructing these structures had the knowledge that is available today, these structures likely would not have collapsed. Nearly all structural failures are avoidable, except for rare circumstances of failures caused by extreme weather. The background of each structure is written out in extensive detail. The failures to be researched will explain the physics of the structure and how human error played a role. The desired outcome of this project is to have a better understanding of why these structures failed. To achieve this outcome, the group needs a fixed goal. The group determined focusing on a particular type of structure and type of failure would allow for focused research. Only bridges will be researched in the three structures written about in the final report. The type of failure will not be due to natural disaster, but it will be human error based. This goal will allow for specific learning of what errors can cause failure in bridges.
This project is designed to look at structural failures and why they happened. This project will be a twenty-page report that looks at three different failures. The failures will be looked at in depth to ensure every piece of evidence was looked at. The objectives for learning will be to gain a better understanding of why these structures actually failed. If the engineers who were constructing these structures had the knowledge that is available today, these structures likely would not have collapsed. Nearly all structural failures are avoidable, except for rare circumstances of failures caused by extreme weather. The background of each structure is written out in extensive detail. The failures to be researched will explain the physics of the structure and how human error played a role. The desired outcome of this project is to have a better understanding of why these structures failed. To achieve this outcome, the group needs a fixed goal. The group determined focusing on a particular type of structure and type of failure would allow for focused research. Only bridges will be researched in the three structures written about in the final report. The type of failure will not be due to natural disaster, but it will be human error based. This goal will allow for specific learning of what errors can cause failure in bridges.
Week 7
This week the group focused on putting together a power point which would during their presentation the following week. The power point is laid out in a manner where each person will present their information one after the other. Emmanuel will begin by giving the introduction, letting the audience know what the project consists of and the reasons that the group chose this project. Next the bridges will be presented in this order; Quebec bridge, Tacoma Narrows bridge, and then the Silvers bridge. Members will talk about when the bridge was constructed, what the causes of failure were, and finally what lessons were learned from these mistakes. The group will be presenting their research on the three bridges to the rest of the class. Emmanuel will be responsible for introducing the project to the class, consisting of the project overview, purpose of the project, and the deliverable for the project. He will also be giving the conclusion of the project. The other members will be responsible for presenting their individual bridges to the group. Week 8
This week the group focused on making corrections to their final draft as well as corrections to the powerpoint. Although we were supposed to present, there was not enough time to do so. Thus after attending lecture, where Mr. Terranova discussed "Do's" and "Don't's" for the presentation, the group decided that it would be in their best interest to correct their slides. Finally the group worked on perfecting their final draft. This is the first paragraph of the final report, the abstract;
The motivation for
this project is to gain a better understanding of mistakes that lead
to structural failures.
It is important to learn about causes of structural failures, because as future
civil engineers it will be our responsibility to ensure that our constructions
do not fail. Conducting research now teaches us what mistakes can be avoided
and what measures can be taken on a future construction project. There are
various goals for this project. The group will research to understand the
physics behind each of the three major failures, and what engineering mistakes
led to these failures. The group will also uncover whether these mistakes could
have been avoided. The technical challenges will include finding credible
sources and writing a concise but informative report. Our approach to this will
be researching the three major structural failures and then giving background
and reasoning for their failures. The final deliverable is a twenty-page
report that includes the three major failures. This report will serve as the
only deliverable for this project.
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